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I. INTRODUCTION
When CDN Electronica SnC in Vicenza (CDN), an Italian electronics com-
pany, went bankrupt, its employees were unable to collect wages they were due.'
CDN's insolvency caused a depletion of CDN's funds leaving many of their
1. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357, 5406, 2 C.M.L.R. 66,
73 (1993). See infra notes 109-186 and accompanying text (discussing and examining the case in its entirety).
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financial obligations unmet.2 As a result, Mr. Francovich, an Italian citizen and
employee of CDN, received only sporadic payments of wages he was due.3
Frustrated with CDN's inability to fulfill its financial obligation to him, Mr.
Francovich brought suit to recover his earned wages. Although a judgment was
rendered against CDN, the company was insolvent and Mr. Francovich recovered
nothing.4 Consequently, Mr. Francovich sued the State of Italy on a theory of
state liability for directive nonimplementation.5 Mr. Francovich asserted that
Italy's failure to implement Directive 80/987 rendered his claim worthless and,
therefore, Italy should compensate him.6
As a member state of the European Union (EU), Italy is bound to implement
EU directives into the Italian national system of laws.7 Directives are laws created
by the European Parliament for adaptation and implementation by member
states In cases of directive nonimplementation, the question generally posed is
whether a directive creates any individual rights enforceable by the national
courts. A secondary but equally important question posed by Francovich v.
Italian Republic, is whether the legal quality of a directive depends upon
implementation by a member state. Francovich v. Italian Republic answers these
questions. First, directives create rights for individuals in the presence of direct
effect? Second, that member states can be held directly liable for nonimple-
mentation of directives.'"
Utilizing the case of Francovich v. Italian Republic," this casenote examines
the remedies available to nationals when their member state fails to implement an
EU Directive. Part II provides a legal background to the European Union,
directives, and the theory of direct effect. 2 Building upon the workings of the
European Union and the theory of direct effect, Part III puts Francovich v. Italian
Republic in context, tracing the evolution of case law on the theory of direct
2. Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. at 5406.2 C.M.L.R. at 73.
3. Id.
4. Id., 2 C.M.L.R. at 74.
5. Id. See infra notes 161-186 and accompanying text (discussing the theory of state liability for
directive nonimplementation).
6. Id., 2 C.M.L.R. at 74.
7. See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text (delineating the role of directives in the European
Union [hereinafter EU] and describing the responsibility of member state signatories to the Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community with respect to directives).
8. See infra notes 23-50 and accompanying text (explaining directives and the duties incumbent upon
member state signatories to the EEC TREATY under article 189).
9. Francovich v. Italian Republic does not establish the theory of direct effect but upholds the
precedence of prior case law establishing and refining the concept of direct effect. See infra notes 51-59
(defining direct effect). To understand this evolution, seeinfra notes 60-88 and accompanying text (describing
the evolution of case law on direct effect).
10. This is quite a notable holding which should have a great impact on member state efficacy in
directive implementation. See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text (examining the legal ramifications
of the case of Francovich v. Italian Republic).
I1. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. at 5357, 2 C.M.L.R. at 66
(1993).
12. See infra notes 18-59 and accompanying text.
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effect. 3 Focusing on the subject of controversy, Part IV provides an analysis of
Directive 80/987 and the protection its implementation would have insured Italian
employees. 4 Part V discusses the facts, procedural history, and decision of
Francovich v. Italian Republic.S Part VI then addresses the legal ramifications
of Francovich v. Italian Republic on member state liability for directive
nonimplementation within EU law.'6 Finally, Part VII concludes with a look
towards further possible evolution of case law with respect to member state
liability for directive nonimplementation. -
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. European Union
Created in 1957, the purpose of the European Community (EC) is to promote
free movement of goods, persons, capital and services among member states.'8 In
1987, the Single European Act (SEA) 9 was passed to help effectuate
harmonization between member states in order to achieve the goals of the EC.2.°
The SEA called for a transformation of relations among member states into a
European Union and changed the name of the union of member states from the
European Community to the European Union.2' Within the SEA, member states
recognized "the responsibility incumbent upon Europe to aim at speaking ever
increasingly with one voice and to act with consistency and solidarity in order
more effectively to protect its common interests and independence, in particular
to display the principles of democracy and compliance with the law .... 2'
13. See infra notes 60-88 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 89-108 and accompanying text.
15. .See infra notes 109-186 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 204-209 and accompanying text.
18. TREATY ESTABuSHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNrrY [EEC TREATY], Mar. 25,1957,298
U.N.T.S. 11. In 1957, the signing of the EEC TREATY created the European Community [hereinafter EC]. See
PAOLO MENGOZZI, EUROPEAN ComuNrY LAW (Patrick Del Duca trans., 1990). The EEC Treaty created a
legal system which includes EC member states and their citizens. Case 26/62, Van Gend EN Loos v.
Nederlandese Belastingadministratie, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
19. The Single European Act, July 1, 1987,30 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. 169) pmbl. (1987) [hereinafter
SEA].
20. Id. The Single European Act amended the EEC Treaty. The Single European Act was an attempt
to further effectuate the EEC Treaty, "to improve the economic and social situation [of the EC] by extending
common policies and pursuing new objectives ... to ensure a smoother functioning of the Communities...
/Id.
21. Id. The name change can be interpreted as an attempt to delineate the realization by the European
Parliament of the importance of cohesiveness and unity among member states in order to effectively ensure
fulfillment of the goals established by the member states in the EEC Treaty. Id.
22. Id.
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B. Directives
European Union Directives created by act of the European Commission,
facilitate harmonization of certain policies and laws between member states of the
European Union in order to achieve the EU goals of a single common market.
In order to facilitate harmonization, directives set forth rules to regulate areas of
Union concern with respect to free movement of goods, persons, capital and
services among EU member states.24 These directives bind the member states to
which they are addressed.' However, the effectiveness of directives within each
of the member states depend on implementing legislation.
26
A directive's provisions are not automatically integrated into any of the
member states' legal systems, but must be directly implemented through state
legislation.' Article 189 states that directives merely formulate results to be
achieved, leaving the form, manner, and method with which to achieve the
directive's goals to member state authorities?
The legal effects of a directive are a matter of interpretation by the courts of
each individual member state and the European Court of Justice. Although
member states in theory are bound by the EEC Treaty as signatories to implement
directives, in practice they may or may not implement enforcing legislation. 29 As
a result of the freedom of member states regarding directive implementation,
many member states ultimately fail to implement directives." Since member state
23. Within the EC system, the national courts of each member state apply the provisions of community
law presented in the form of directives to cases within their jurisdiction. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
"Where Community authorities have by directive imposed on Member Sta;es the obligation to pursue a
particular course of conduct the useful effect of such act would be weakened if individuals were prevented from
relying on it before their national courts." Case 51/76, Verbond van Nederlandse Ondememingen v. Inspecteur
der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1977 E.C.R. 113, 126-127, 1 C.M.L.R. 413,429 (1977). Thus, the individual
national courts are left to ensure that EC rules have full effect and, through their enactment, function to protect
the rights which they confer on individuals through their creation. Case 10677, Amministrazione delle Finanze
dello Stato v. Simmenthal, 1978 E.C.R. 629,3 C.M.L.R. 263.
24. EEC TREATY, supra note 18. arts. 3 & 189.
25. MENGOzzt, supra note 18, at 90. "[T]he binding nature of a directive, which constitutes the basis
for the possibility of relying on the directive before a national court, exists only in relation to 'each member
state to which addressed."' Case 152/84, M.H. Marshall v. Southhampton and South-west Hampshire Area
Health Authority Teaching, 1986 E.C.R. 723,749, 1 C.M.L.R. 688, 700 (1986).
26. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, aft 189:
Directives are part of a two stage system of legislation. At the first stage, the subject
matter of the law to be harmonized and the time limit for implementation by the
Member-States are determined. At the second stage, the Member-States have to
translate the directives addressed to them into national law within the time limit
applicable to them.
Case 123/84, Kloppenberg v. Finanzamt Leer, I C.M.L.R. 873.
27. EEC TREATY, supra note 18. art. 189. Under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, a directive will not
cause a modification of internal law in the absence of an implementing act. Id.
28. Id.
29. See infra notes 200-202 and accompanying text (discussing nonimplementation of directives).
30. The prevalence of laxity by member states in directive implementation can be appreciated by
examining the volume of cases brought in the European Court of Justice resulting from nonimplementation
by member states of directives under Article 189 of the EEC TREATY. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
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noncompliance greatly weakens the effectiveness of directives and in turn the
European Union,3' the European Court of Justice continually struggles with ways
to ensure member state compliance with directives. The case of Francovich v.
Italian Republic addresses a new approach by the Court to ensure directive imple-
mentation. This approach is member state liability for directive nonimplemen-
tation.32
According to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, 3 there is a distinction between
different sources of EU law; small regulations are directly applicable without
need for implementation by member states, while directives, in order to become
effective, require implementation by the member states to whom they are
addressed.35 As a result of the language of Article 189, the European Court of
Justice has traditionally held that a directive does not create individual rights in
the absence of national legislative implementation.36 This reasoning arises from
the language of Article 189 which states that a directive only binds the member
states to which addressed, and additionally requires action by individual member
states as to the form and methods of the directive's implementation before any
individual rights are created.37
The EEC Treaty provides that each member state of the European Union must
implement EU directives into their own system of national laws.3 According to
Article 164 of the EEC Treaty, the European Court of Justice ensures that
member states observe EU law in their interpretation and application of the EEC
Treaty.
39
To help insure implementation of EU directives, the European Court of Justice
has stated that "a member state which has not adopted the implementing measures
required by an EU directive within the prescribed period may not plead its own
failure to perform its obligations under the directive against its own nationals. '40
This holding dinderscores the gravity of member states' shirking their
31. See infra notes 187-203 and accompanying text (describing the legal ramifications of member state
noncompliance in directive implementation).
32. See infra notes 161-186 and accompanying text (addressing state liability for nonimplementation).
33. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
34. Regulations, like directives, are a type of EU law. For information on the operation of regulations
and their legal effect upon member states, see DERRICK WYATr & ALAN DASHWOOD, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
LAW 66-69 (1993).
35. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 189. Article 189 defines and lays out the distinctions within EEC
law between regulations and directives, particularly the need for member state action through legislation in
order to effectuate implementation of directives. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. The member states of the European Union who are all signatories to the SEA are: Belgium.
Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal and the UK.
SEA, supra note 19. In signing the SEA these member states have accepted the original principles of the EEC
Treaty and the changes established by the SEA committing themselves as members to the goals and obligations
of the European Union. Id.
39. EEC TR9ATY, supra note 18. art. 164.
40. Case 221188. European Coal and Steel Community v. Acciaierie e Ferriere Busseni SpA, 1990
E.C.R. 495.
The Transnational Lawyer/ Vol. 7
responsibility by not implementing directives. Essentially, member states guilty
of nonimplementation are left without protection from nationals claiming
noncompliance.4'
The EEC Treaty provides that the law of the European Union shall be supreme
over the laws of member states.42 Directives effectuate adherence and compliance
with EU law in each of the individual member states.4a Directives serve as "acts
which are designed to produce legal consequences for one or more member states
in so far as such states are obligated to put into effect the result that is set forth in
the act." Further, directives are created on behalf of member states and not
individuals.45 The creation of directives allows pertinent results to be achieved
within the European Union. Thus, directives ensure parity of results while
allowing individual member states to determine their means of application.
Under Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, member states must take all measures
necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive.47 When a question of
nonimplementation arises, the European Court of Justice examines the member
state's method of implementation, and evaluated the concomitant result.4 In
making this determination, the European Court of Justice also considers the form,
substance, and function of the member state's measures taken in response to the
directive, examining their overall context and effect within the European Union.
4 9
If a member state fails in its obligation to implement a directive, it is liable to an
injured party if three conditions are met: (1) the directive grants legal rights to
individuals; (2) the content of those rights can be ascertained from the provisions
of the directive; and (3) a causal link between the breach of the state's obligation
and the harm suffered by the injured parties can be established.50
41. Id.
42. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, arts. 5 & 169. Article 5 states that member states are obligated to take
all appropriate measures in order to ensure fulfillment of obligations arising out of the Treaty prohibiting
measures which could jeopardize the objectives of the Treaty. Id. art. 5. Article 169 lays out the repercussions
for member states not adhering to the Treaty, which includes possible action by the European Court of Justice.
Id. art. 169. Therefore, taken together, the language of Article 5 and Article 169 of the EEC Treaty can be
interpreted to mean EEC law is supreme. The European Court of Justice has had occasion to directly address
the issue of supremacy of EU law. One case, Commission v. Italy, established that with respect to EC law, "no
appeal to provisions of internal law of any kind whatever can prevail." Case 48171, Commission v. Italy, 1972
E.C.R. 527, 535. In addition, in Costa v. ENEL, the court stated, "the EEC Treaty has created its own legal
system which on the entry into force of the Treaty became an integral part of the legal system of the Member
States and which their courts are bound to apply." Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 1964 E.C.R. 585, 602, 3
C.M.L.R. 425,456 (1964).
43. EECTREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
44. R.H. LAUWAARS, LAWFULNESS AND LEGAL FORCE OF COMMUNITY DECISIONS 37 (1973).
45. Id. at 36. "Directives can only bring into being rights for individuals as a reflex of the obligations
imposed upon the States." Id.
46. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
47. Id.
48. Case 33170, Spa S.A.C.E. v. Ministry for Finance of the Italian Republic, 1970 E.C.R. 1213, 1223-
24. C.M.L.R.123, 132 (1971).
49. Id.
50. Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5373,2 C.M.L.R. 66-67
(1993).
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C. Direct Effect
In order to find a directive directly effective, the European Court of Justice has
stated that the directive must contain "clear and unconditional legal norms and ...
not leave normative discretion to the member states."' If a directive manifests a
clear intent to place a duty upon member states to carry out a specific purpose, it
is directly effective.52 Utilizing the language of the directive, the Court must
attempt to determine the reasons for establishing the directive and the
implications of its implementation.53 If the Court finds the purpose and intent of
a directive sufficiently clear, and the directive is not implemented within the
timetable prescribed, the European Court of Justice can effectuate compliance by
ruling it directly effective.' It is important to note that if a directive has been
implemented before the prescribed period, an individual cannot argue direct effect
in the national courts of their member state.55 By implementing a directive within
its prescribed time period,a member state fulfills its obligation to the EU and the
issue becomes one that must be dealt with on the national level. 56
The concept of direct effect stems from the goals of the European Union in
establishing a single common market. According to the EEC Treaty, directives
serve to establish the desired single common market of the European Union by
effectuating and facilitating subsequent legislation among the member states on
the topics of the directives." Direct effect allows directives to become binding in
the absence of additional member state legislation.58 The recognition of direct
effect was the first step in the evolution of EU case law attempting to ensure
fulfillment of EU directives and, thus, the goals of the EU.59
51. Case 41/74, Yvonne van Duyn v. Home Office (Van Duyn), 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1354-55, 1
C.M.L.R. 1, 15 (1975). Van Duyn clarifed the test for direct effect. Id. The Court interpreted Article 189 of the
EEC Treaty as saying, if a directive has "clear and unconditional legal norms and does not leave normative
discretion to the members states," it is directly effective, meaning there is no need for member state
implementation in order for the directive to have binding effect. Id.
52. Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein (Grad), 1970 E.C.R. 825, 837, C.M.L.R. 1, 24
(1971).
53. Id. "[I]n each particular case, it must be ascertained whether the nature, background and wording
of the provision in question, are capable of producing direct effects in the legal relationships between the
addressee of the act and third parties." Id. at 826.
54. Case 8/8 1, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, 1 C.M.L.R. 499 (1982).
The question of the direct effect of a directive can arise only where a Member State has
failed in its duty to implement the directive and a person claims the right to defend
himself against the activities of the Member State by relying on the provisions of the
directive.
Case 270/81, Felicitas Rickmers-Linie KG & Co. v. Finanzamt fur Verkehrsteuem, 1982 E.C.R. 2771, 2779,
3 C.M.L.R. 447,460 (1982).
55. WVYATr & DASHWOOD, supra note 34, at 72. "National legislative implementation of a directive
constitutes both the due performance of a Community obligation, and the exercise of a sovereign choice to
exclude the direct application of the directive itself by the national courts." Id.
56. See supra notes 23-30 and accompanying text (generally describing Directives).
57. EECTREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
58. See infra notes 6D-85 and accompanying text (analyzing the cases of Grad & RattO.
59. See infra notes 60-88 and accompanying text (outlining the evolution of case law on direct effect).
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III. EVOLUTION OF CASE LAW ON DIRECT EFFECT
Several cases have addressed the concept of direct effect, and they serve as
examples of the manner in which the court determines whether a directive has
direct effect.6 In Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein (Grad),6' the Court
established that directives can vest rights in individuals.62 Grad dealt with an obli-
gation imposed upon member states by Directive 62/227' and Directive 69/463,(4
dealing with the harmonization of member state legislation with respect to
turnover taxes.65 In the case, Grad asked the Court whether the obligation of
Directive 67/2276 and its deadline for completion vested rights in individuals
which the national court had to uphold and protect.67 In order to respond to
Grad's question, the Court utilized the concept of direct effect.6 Through Grad,
the Court established the idea that the efficacy of directives presents a matter of
statutory interpretation.69
In the case of Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti (Ratti),70 the Board of
Directors of the undertaking of Silvam of Senago, represented by Ratti, a board
member, decided to package its solvents and affix labels to their containers in
conformance with Directive 73/73 and Directive 77/728, which set out require-
ments for varnish and solvent labeling to promote trade and free movement of
goods.7' Since Italy. had a stricter law for labeling, the Italian government pro-
60. In addition to the cases discussed infra notes 61-76, see Case 36n5, Roland Rutili v. Minister for
the Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219, 1 C.M.L.R. 140 (1976), Case 51n6, Verbond van Nederlandse Ondernemingen
v. Inspecteur der Invoerrechten en Accijnzen, 1977 E.C.R. 113, 1 C.M.L.R. 413 (1977), Case 8/81, Becker v.
Finanzamt Munster-lnnenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, 1 C.M.L.R. 499 (1982), and Case 255/81, R.A. Grendel
GmbH v. Finazamt fur Korperschaften in Hamburg, 1982 E.C.R. 2301, 1 C.M.L.R. 379 (1983).
61. Case 9no, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, C.M.L.R. 1 (1971).
62. Id. The interpretation that directives can vest rights in individuals has been viewed as the traditional
interpretation of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art.189.
63. Council Directive No. 62/227, 1965-1966 O.J. SPEC. ED. 67.
64. Council Directive No. 69/463, 1969 O.J. SPEC. ED. 551.
65. See supra notes 63-64.
66. Council Directive No. 62/227, 1965-1966 OJ. SPEC. ED. 67.
67. Case 9no, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein (Grad), 1970 E.C.R. 825, 828, C.M.L.R. 1, 22
(1971). On March 1, 1969, Mr. Franz Grad transported 25.3 tons of preserved fruit from Hamburg to Austria.
Id. The German customs office imposed a tax on Grad for the carriage of the goods. Id. Grad claimed the tax
infringed on EEC law, particularily Directive 65/271 and Directive 56/227. Id. The two directives prohibit
member states from applying turnover taxes concurrently with specific taxes and they force member states to
abolish turnover taxes by January 1, 1992. Id. at 827-28.
68. lL at 841. The Court found direct effect for the prohibition on conneurrent taxes since the directives
granted clearly delineated specific rights to individuals. Id. With respect to the abolishment of turnover taxes,
the Court found no direct effect since member states had until January 1, 1972 to fulfill the requirement of
abolition. Id. at 842.
69. Id. at 842. In Grad, the Court interpreted the specificity of the rights granted by the Directives,
focusing on whether they were clearly applicable to individuals. Id. Utilizing their statutory interpretation, the
Court made a finding of direct effect. Id. The Court then examined the tax on carriage and found it was not
prohibited until the passage of the prescribed date of January 1, 1972. Id. Thus, the Court's interpretation of
a directive becomes the ultimate control over its efficacy. Id.
70. Case 148n8, Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti (Ratti) 1979 E.C.R. 1629, 1 C.M.L.R. 96 (1980).
71. Id. at 1631-32, 1 C.M.L.R. at 108.
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secuted Ratti for infringement of Italian law.' Ratti claimed the directives in issue
were directly effective, and consequently granted him personal rights that the
Italian courts have an obligation to protect. 73 Ratti specifically argued that under
the test of Van Duyn, 4 the directives imposed detailed and complete obligations
leaving no margin in the discretion of the member states.75 Ratti demonstrated the
precise and detailed obligations of member states under the directives by citing
provisions concerning requirements for the size, color, shape, and position of the
label.76 Italy claimed that member states had two years to implement the
Directives so that Italian law applied until the two year implementation period
expired.' The Court agreed with the position of Ratti and found direct effect due
to the clear and precise obligations laid out for the member states in the
directive. 8
The cases of Ratti and Grad offer a useful contrast. In Ratti, Italy passed laws
to comply with EC Directives 73/73 and 77/728, and met all of the requirements
necessary to insure effective implementation of the directives before the pre-
scribed time period for implementation passed! 9 Thus, the Court found the
directive directly effective although the prescribed time period for implementation
had not yet passed. In Grad, although the laws implementing the directive were
put in place, the laws conflicting with the directive were repealed before the
prescribed time period for the directive's implementation had expired!' There-
fore, the Court found no direct effect."1 If left in place, the German law Grad was
contensting would have violated the specific rights granted to individuals in the
directives.8 2 Yet the Court found it fully within the power of Germany to repeal
its established laws and create an alternative approach to fulfilling the require-
ments of the directives before the expiration of their implementation period.83
When no direct effect is found, as in Grad, individuals are left without the right
to a private cause of action. In such case, a directive can only be enforced by
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1633, 1 C.M.L.R. at 109.
74. Id. at 1634, 1 C.M.L.R. at 110. See supra note 51 (explaining the direct effect test ofVan Duyn).
75. Case 148/78, Pubblico Ministero v. Tullio Ratti (Ratti) 1979 E.C.R. 1629, 1634, 1 C.M.L.R. 96
(1980).
76. Id., I C.M.L.R. at 110-11.
77. ld., 1 C.M.L.R. at 96.
78. Id. at 1642, 1 C.M.L.R. at 110.
79. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
81. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (discussing direct effect).
82. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (delineating the standards for direct effect).
83. Case 255/81, R.A. Grendel GmbH v. Finanzamt fur Korperschaften (Grendel), 1982 E.C.R. 2301,
2308, 1 C.M.L.R. 379 (1983). "[A] Community Provision cannot be said to have direct effect before the
enactment of the provision of national law which is indispensable to its perfection." Id.
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means of an action brought in the European Court of Justice by the Commission'
or by a member state under Articles 169-171 of the EEC Treaty.'5
If not revoked, the implementation of a directive before the prescribed time
period creates direct effect." The Court, however, has failed to address whether
there can be a finding of direct effect when implementation does not occur after
the prescribed implementation time period. In R.A. Grendel GmbH v. Finanzamt
fur Korperschaften in Hamburg, the Court dispensed with the issue saying, "[i]f
it proves impossible to implement a directive within the time fixed for doing so,
the only action compatible with Community law which a Member State can adopt
is to take the appropriate initiatives to obtain an extension of time. ' 7 This
language suggests that the Court will find direct effect if a directive, in the
absence of an extension of time, is not implemented within the prescribed time
period.
In light of the above precedents, Francovich v. Italian Republic extends the
application of direct effect, taking it to its next level of evolution. Francovich v.
Italian Republic seeks to answer the question that previous cases failed to answer:
can there be a finding of direct effect after the prescribed time period for a
directive's implementation has passed? Francovich v. Italian Republic addresses
Italy's failure to implement, within the prescribed period, an EU directive pro-
tecting the interests of employees when their employer becomes insolvent. The
case specifically examines the effect of Italy's nonimplementation of Directive
80/987 on the individual rights of Italian citizens. After discussing the theory of
direct effect and state liability for directive nonimplementation, the Court
ultimately finds Italy liable to the complainant employees!'
IV. ANALYSIS OF DIRECTIVE 80/987
At the center of the controversy in Francovich v. Italian Republic is Directive
80/987'9 which equalizes EU member state laws relating to protection of
employees in the event of their employers' insolvency.' The Directive seeks to
guarantee payment of employees' outstanding wage claims upon the insolvency
84. The European Commission is a body of the European Union established by the EEC Treaty. EEC
TREATY, supra note 18, art. 3. The Commission consists of representatives of each of the member states of the
European Union. Id. The Commission formulates EU law and is responsible for monitoring its enforcement.
EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 155.
85. T.C. HARTLEY, THE FOUNDATIONS OFEUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW 208 (1981).
86. See infra notes 60-78 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases involving direct effect).
87. Case 255/81, R.A. Grendel GmbH v Finanzamt fur Korperschaften in Hamburg, 1982 E.C.R. 2301,
2316, 1 C.M.L.R. 379 (1983).
88. Case 6190 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,2 C.M.L.R. 66, 115 (1993).
See infra notes 126-186 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's discussion of direct effect and state
liability for directive nonimplementation).
89. Council Directive No. 80/987, 1980 OJ. (L 283) 23 [hereinafter Directive].
90. Id.
592
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of their employer.9 It also seeks to balance economic and social development in
the EU by accounting for the varied economies of member states.9 2
Section I of the Directive establishes the applicability of the Directive!3
Article 1 limits the Directive's application to employees' claims arising from
contracts of employment or from existing employment relationships?' Certain
claims may be excluded due to "the special nature of the employees' contracts of
employment, employment relationships, or the availability of other protection
equivalent to that of the Directive." 5 Article 2 defines insolvency within the
meaning of the Directive as occurring in two specific instances: 9' (1) when a re-
quest has been made under the appropriate member state laws for the instigation
of proceedings involving an employer's assets to satisfy creditors; 97 and (2) when
an authority competent to do so under member state laws has instigated pro-
ceedings involving an employer's assets or has established that the employer's
undertaking or business has been definitively closed down with insufficient assets
to warrant initiation of proceedings for recovery.
98
Section II explains the role of guarantee institutions in carrying out the
Directive. 99 Article 3 requires member states to "ensure that guarantee institutions
guarantee.., payment of employees' outstanding claims resulting from contracts
of employment or employment relationships... prior to a given date. ''tro Each
member state may choose the date of payment.'0' The date can be the date of the
onset of the employer's insolvency, the date of the notice of dismissal issued to
the employee concerned on account of the employer's insolvency, or the date of
discontinuation of the contract of employment or the employment relationship
due to the employer's insolvency. 2 Once a date is chosen, Article 4 gives
member states the option of limiting the liability of the guarantee institutions
discussed in Article 3.t03 The process used depends upon the calculation date
91. Id.
92. Id. The Directive allows certain categories of employees within specific member states to be
excluded from the scope of the Directive. Id. § I, art. 1. These categories include employees having a contract
of employment or an employment relationship of a special nature and employees covered by other forms of
guarantees. Id. The exceptions recognize the existence of guarantees already in place and the presence of
special contracts or relationships that might not be able to continue if they are held bound to the Directive. Id.
These exceptions apply to specific member states with the recognition that member states are in different
positions and achievement of complete parity among member states should not be forced when it will result
in hardship. See id.
93. Directive, supra note 89, § I. Section 1 includes Articles I and 2. Id.
94. Id. art. 1.
95. Id.
96. Id. art. 2.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Directive, supra note 89, § 11. Section II consists of articles 3,4, and 5. Id.
100. Id. art. 3.
101. Id. art. 3.
102. Id.
103. Id. art. 4.
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chosen by the member state pursuant to Article 3."° Rules for organization,
financing, and operation of the guarantee institution, according to Article 5, must
be promulgated by the member states."0 5 Member states must also ensure that
employers contribute to the institutions and that the institutions' assets are
independent of the employer's operating capital, thereby remaining inaccessible
in insolvency proceedings against the employer.' 6 Furthermore, in order to
ensure their payment, member states may exempt contributions due under
national social security schemes, supplemental schemes, or intercompany
schemes."0 7
Taken in its entirety, Directive 80/987 works to protect employees upon
employer insolvency by guaranteeing payment of their outstanding wage claims.
Created to promote equality among the laws of member states, the Directive
explicitly recognizes and accounts for differences among member states in their
economies and employment structures until equality is achieved. The Directive
also allows certain categories of employees to be exempted from protection under
the Directive."3 The Directive equalizes member state laws protecting employees
upon employer insolvency and seeks to uniformly protect EU workers. Thus, due
to its explicitness and the important functions the Directive serves, effective
implementation of Directive 80/987 is quite important.
V. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
A. Facts
Francovich v. Italian Republic consolidates two cases brought against Italy for
recovery of unpaid wages, Francovich v. Italian Republic and Bonifaci v. Italy. 9
In both cases, employees sued Italy on a theory of directive nonimplementation
as a result of Italy's failure to implement Directive 80/987.t"' In the first case, Mr.
Francovich, an employee of CDN Electronica SnC in Vicenza (CDN), brought
action against CDN to recover unpaid wages. "' Because Mr. Francovich received
only sporadic payments of his wages from CDN, he brought proceedings before
the Pretore di Vicenza"' in order to recover his unpaid wages." 3 By judgment of
104. See id. art. 3.
105. Id. art. 5.
106. Id.
107. Id. art. 6
108. Directive, supra note 89, annex. See supra note 92 (specifying those employees exempt from the
Directive).
109. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,2 C.M.L.R 66 (1993).
110. Id. at 5406-07,2 C.M.L.R. at 73-75.
111. Id. at 5406,2 C.M.L.R. at 73.
112. Id. The Pretore is the judge of the Pretura. The Pretura is the Magistrate's Court in Italy. C.c. art.
8 (Italy). Article 8 has been amended by law no. 374 dated November 21, 1991, but this amendment has not
yet come into force. The Pretura has civil jurisdiction up to 20,000,000 lire and penal jurisdiction in cases
involving up to three years imprisonment. Id. The Pretura has exclusive first instance in all labor matters and
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January 31, 1985, the Pretore di Vicenza ordered CDN to pay six million lire to
Mr. Francovich, however, the company's insolvency left the claim unsatisfied." 4
Mr. Francovich, therefore, sought to recover judgment from Italy under a theory
of directive nonimplementation. '
In a similar case, Danila Bonifaci and thirty-three other employees brought
proceedings before the Pretore di Bassano del Grappa"6 on April 20, 1989 against
Gaia Confezioni which had been declared insolvent on April 5, 1985. W When the
employment relationship was discontinued, Gaia Confezioni owed Bonifaci and
its other employees more than 253 million lire in back wages." 8 More than five
years after the insolvency, the plaintiffs had been paid nothing and were told that
even a partial distribution of their wages was highly unlikely." 9 Thus, like
Francovich, the employees brought an action against Italy under a theory of
directive nonimplementation 2 °
In the first case, Mr. Francovich claimed entitlement to guarantees under
Directive 80/987, or in the alternative, damages from the Italian state.'' In the
second case, Bonifaci brought proceedings against Italy claiming that, in view of
its obligation to implement Directive 80/987, Italy should be ordered to either pay
their back wages, or in the alternative, damages."n Due to the similarity of the
two cases, they were consolidated and referred to the European Court of Justice
for a preliminary ruling under Article 177." Under this procedure, the Court
considered the issue of Italy's liability as a member state for nonimplementation
of Directive 80/987 in violation of Article 189 of the EEC Treaty.' 24
B. Opinion of the European Court of Justice
In Francovich v. Italian Republic, the European Court of Justice dealt with two
possible responses to Italy's failure to implement Directive 80/987. First, the
in certain special proceedings. Id.
113. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90. Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357, 5406,2 C.M.L.R. 66,
73 (1993).
114. Id.
115. Id., 2 C.M.L.R. at 74.
116. For a brief explanation of Pretore, see supra note 112.






122. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357, 5406, 2 C.M.L.R. 66,
75(1993).
123. Id. at 5405, 2 C.M.L.R. 74. Article 177 of the EEC Treaty gives the European Court of Justice
jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings on interpretation of the EEC Treaty, the validity and interpretations of
acts of institutions of the Community, and interpretation of statutes of bodies established by acts of the Council.
EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 177.
124. Id. at 5405, 2 C.M.L.R. 74. The Court had already recorded Italy's failure to implement Directive
80/987 in Case 22/87, E.C. Commission v. Italy, 1989 E.C.R. 143. Id.
• The Transnational Lawyer / Vol. 7
Court addressed whether the Directive had direct effect, and second, whether
there was state liability on the part of Italy for its failure to implement Directive
80/987. Although the court examined and seemingly found the presence of direct
effect, the court created an ambiguity, thereby utilizing this case as an opportunity
to address the issue of state liability for directive nonimplementation.'t 5
1. Direct Effect
Directive 80/987 specifically provides for payment of unpaid wage claims
guaranteeing a minimum level of protection to employees in the EU in the event
of their employers' insolvency. 26 As a result of Italy's failure to implement the
Directive, Italian employees were not protected when their employer became in-
solvent.' 27 The Court agreed with Mr. Francovich's assertion that Italy should be
liable for the damage that resulted from its nonimplementation of the Directive
80/987.128
Even though a member state fails to fulfill its obligations to take all measures
necessary to achieve the result prescribed by a directive, "if the conditions of the
directive are unconditional and sufficiently precise, they may be relied upon in
the absence of implementing measures to define rights which individuals are able
to assert against the state."'29 The Court used three tests to determine whether the
rights given to employees in Directive 80/987 were unconditional and sufficiently
precise. These tests examined the identity of the persons entitled to the guarantee,
the content of the guarantee, and the identity of the person responsible for
providing the guarantee. 3 In order to determine the identity of the persons en-
titled to the guarantee, the court looked to the explicit language of the Directive.'
Directive 80/987 guarantees employees' claims arising from contracts of
employment or employment relationships existing against insolvent employers. '
The Court acknowledged the precision and clarity of the Directive's articulated
goal, and found the Directive clearly defines insolvency, 33 employment, and
125. See infra notes 145-150 and accompanying text (examining the court created ambiguity preventing
a finding of direct effect).
126. Directive, supra note 89, art. 3.
127. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357, 5405-06, 2 C.M.L.R.
73 (1993).
128. Id. at 5418. 2 C.M.L.R. at 83.
129. Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt (Becker), 1982 E.C.R. 53, 1 C.M.L.R. 499
(1982). Becker reiterates the test from Van Duyn for direct effect Id. For an explanation of the direct effect,
see supra note 51 and accompanying text (setting forth the requirements for a finding of direct effect).
130. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90. Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5408,2 C.M.L.R. 110.
131. Id.
132. Directive, supra note 89, art. 1(1). See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing article
1).
133. Directive, supra note 89, art. 2(1). See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (exploring article
2)
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employee," and expressly delineates those employees excluded from the
Directive. 3 ' As a result of this clarity, the European Court of Justice found the
provisions of the Directive sufficiently precise to enable a member state's national
court to determine whether a claimant is entitled to benefit from the guarantees
of the Directive.'36
According to the Directive, member states must ensure payment of outstanding
claims resulting from contracts of employment or employment relationships.'37
Member states must choose one of three dates from which payment of those
claims must be ensured.' According to the Court, this discretion to choose the
date of payment does not affect the precise and unconditional nature of the result
required.'39 The Court found that for purposes of the Directive, the date of
payment can be determined by using the date which will result in the least
liability for the guarantee institution. t40 Therefore, the content of the guarantee
was held to be sufficiently precise and unconditional due to the specificity of the
Directive in bestowing a duty upon member states to ensure payment of
outstanding claims resulting from employment contracts or employment
relationships.'4
However, in the examination of the identity of the persons liable to provide the
guarantee established under the Directive, the European Court of Justice found
some ambiguity.'42 Each member state must promulgate rules for the organi-
zation, financial support, and operation of an appropriate institution to guarantee
the required payment to employees.'4 3 Yet, the Directive fails to identify the party
liable to provide the guarantee." Consequently, although the provisions of the
Directive are sufficiently precise and unconditional as to the persons entitled to
the guarantee and the content of that guarantee, the provisions do not identify the
person liable to provide the guarantee.'s Interestingly, according to the Court, the
134. Id. art. 2(2). See supra notes 96-98 (discussing article 2). Article 2 specifically provides that in order
to determine what constitutes an employer and an employee, national law is to be used. Id.
135. Id. art. 1(2). See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing article 1).
136. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5408,2 C.M.L.R. 66,
110.
137. For a complete analysis of Directive 80/987, see supra notes 89-108 and accompanying text.
138. Id. See supra note 102 and accompanying text (setting forth the three payment options.)
139. Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5409-10,2 C.M.L.R. 66, 111
(1993).
Mhe right of a State to choose among several possible means of achieving the result
required by a directive does not preclude the possibility for individuals of enforcing
before the national courts rights whose content can be determined sufficiently precisely
on the basis of the provisions of the directives alone.
Id. (citing Case 71/85, Netherlands v. FNV, 1986 E.C.R. 3855, 3 C.M.L.R. 767 (1987) and, Case 286/85,
McDermott v. Minister for Social Welfare, 1987 E.C.R. 1453,2 C.M.L.R. 607 (1987) as its precedent).
140. Id. at 5410,2 C.M.L.R. at I 1l.
141. Id. at5410-11,2C.M.L.R. at Ill.
142. Id. at 5411-12, 2 C.M.L.R. at 113.
143. See supra notes 105-106 and accompanying text (analyzing Directive Article 5).
144. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italy, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5412,2 C.M.L.R. 66, 113 (1993).
145. Id.
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Directive's ambiguity as to who is liable to provide the guarantee does not affect
the nature of the Directive.
t46
Although the Court did not articulate such a finding, it seems a finding of direct
effect would have been appropriate here. 47 Such a finding would have been
consistent with the Court's view of the clarity and precision of the rights created
for individuals and the obligations of the member states. 48 The Court's failure to
ultimately find direct effect strongly suggests that the court created an unneces-
sary ambiguity.
If the Court had found direct effect, it would have merely been applying the
established theory of Becker v7 Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt,49 which would
have allowed a remedy for the complainants. Instead, the Court used Francovich
v. Italian Republic and the theory of direct effect as a stepping stone'to address
state liability to individuals harmed by directive nonimplementation. By
circumventing a finding of direct effect, the Court surreptitiously utilized the case
to take enforceability of directive implementation to a new level. Thus, it could
be argued that the Court essentially created an ambiguity in order to consider state
liability for nonimplementation of directives as a principle of law.5
146. Id. at 5410,2 C.M.L.R. at 111.
In this case the result required by the directive in question is a guarantee that the
outstanding claims of employees will be paid in the event of insolvency of their
employer. The fact that Articles 3 and 4(1) and (2) give the member-States some
discretion as regards the means of establishing that guarantee and the restriction of its
amount do not affect the precise and unconditional result of the results required.
Id.
147. Id. at 5412,2 C.M.L.R. at 113.
[E]ven though the provisions of the directive in question are sufficiently precise and
unconditional as regards the determination of the persons entitled to the guarantee and
as regards the content of that guarantee, those elements are nbt sufficient to enable
individuals to rely on those provisions before the national courts. Those provisions do
not identify the person liable to provide the guarantee, and the State cannot be
considered liable on the sole ground that it has failed to take transposition measures
within the prescribed period.
Id..
148. See supra notes 130-146 and accompanying text (discussing the rights and obligations).
149. Case 8/81, Becker v. Finanzamt Munster-Innenstadt, 1982 E.C.R. 53, 1 C.M.L.R. 499 (1982). See
supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (describing the theory of direct effect).
150. See infra notes 174-177 (addressing the Advocate General's response to the court's creation of an
ambiguity).
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Like the Court, the Advocate General... found the provisions of the Directive
precise in identifying those employees protected and intended to benefit. 52 As to
the scope of the rights, the Advocate General agreed that it is impossible to know
which solution Italy would have adopted had it implemented the Directive. 53 The
Court, however, assumed that although it is unclear which option Italy would
have chosen, the minimum guarantee of the Directive could be determined by
using the date which would result in the least liability for the guarantee
institution."M The Advocate General disagreed with the Court's reasoning, finding
the provision imprecise since it is unclear which date Italy would have chosen.' 5
According to the Advocate General, it is not possible to find a minimum
obligation as the Court claims because the liability limit is dependant upon the
date chosen by the member state for payment.
156
Since Italy did not implement the Directive, it is impossible to know which
date would have been selected.' 57 Therefore, the Advocate General did not find
the provisions defining the scope of the rights of the directive unconditional and
sufficiently precise, due to the broad discretion left to member states.58 The
Advocate General did agree with the Court's finding that the provisions of the
Directive are not sufficiently precise and unconditional in order to determine the
guarantor. 59 Thus, the Advocate General ultimately agreed with the Court's
finding that Directive 80/987 may not be used to define rights which individuals
may assert against the state through the theory of direct effect."
151. The European Court of Justice has thirteen judges who are assisted by six Advocates General.
P.S.R.F. MATHuSEN, A GUIDETO EUROPEAN COMMUNrrY LAW 2,70-71(5th ed. 1990). An Advocate General
is chosen from
[P]eople whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications
required for appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries. An
Advocate General serves in an independent capacity by carrying out his own personal
examination of the case and expressing personal opinions. The Advocate General's
opinion does not necessarily reflect the views of the European Court of Justice; however
it often contains clues to the reasoning which led to the decision of the Court.
Id. The Advocate General in Francovich v. Italian Republic classified the case as serving a dual role: first, it
ruled on the possible direct effect of 80/987 and its provisions, and second, it determined member state liability
for failing to implement a binding directive. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991
E.C.R. 5357,5372,2 C.M.L.R. 66,74 (1993).
152. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5374,2 C.M.L.R. 66,
76-77 (1993).
153. Id. at 5377. 2 C.M.L.R. at 78.
154. Id. at 5410.2 C.M.L.R. at 78.
155. Id. at 5377, 2 C.M.L.R. at 78.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 5374,2 C.M.L.R. at 78.
158. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90. Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5377,2 C.M.L.R. 66,
81(1993).
159. Id. at 5377-78, 2 C.M.L.R. at 78.
160. Id. at 5378-79.2 C.M.L.R. at 78.
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2. State Liability for Nonimplementation
In bypassing the issue and not finding direct effect, the Court moved on to
consider the issue of state liability for nonimplementation of Directive 80/987.
Article 5 of the EEC Treaty16 requires member states to take all appropriate
measures to ensure fulfillment of obligations arising out of the EEC Treaty by
facilitating the achievement of the European Union's tasks and goals.'62 Member
states must implement those laws and administrative provisions necessary to
comply with Directives handed down by the EU within the prescribed
implementation period.' 63
Directives further EU goals by protecting citizen rights and harmonizing mem-
ber state rules." 4 In order to protect the rights of individuals, directives must be
enforced. 65 When these rights are violated, the European Court of Justice has
held that individuals must be able to obtain remedies for infringement of their
rights.' 66 As a result, member states must be held responsible for breach of Euro-
pean Union law. 67 'The principle of State liability for harm caused to individuals
by breaches of [Union] law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent
in the system of the Treaty."'8 The EEC Treaty requires member state action in
order to facilitate the effectiveness of EU law and ensure the fulfillment of EU
goals. Therefore, in the absence of member state action, individuals cannot
attempt to enforce rights established by the European Union.'
69
Pursuant to Article 189 of the EEC Treaty, a directive binds each member state
to which it is addressed as to the result to be achieved.' 0 Because Italy failed to
161. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 5.
162. 144
163. Id. art. 11.
164. See supra notes 23-50 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose and role of directives in the
European Community).
165. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, arts. 5 & 189.
166. Case 6160, Humblet v. Belgium, 1960 E.C.R. 559. "[The full effectiveness of Community rules
would be impaired and the protection of rights which they grant would be weakened if individuals were unable
to obtain compensation when their rights are infringed by a breach of Community law for which a member-
State can be held responsible." Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,
5414, 2 C.M.L.R. 66, 114 (1993).
167. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5414,2 C.M.L.R. 66,
114(1993).
The full effectiveness of [Union] rules would be impaired and the protection of the rights which they
grant would be weakened if individuals were unable to obtain redress when their rights are infringed
by a breach of [Union] law for which a Member State can be held responsible.
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensible where ... the
full effectiveness of [Union] rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and where,
consequently, in absence of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the national courts the rights




170. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
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implement Directive 80/987, Italian employees were not in a position to collect
their unpaid wages if their employer became insolvent. 17 Consequently, under
Article 189 and the theory of nonimplementation, the Court found Italy directly
liable to its nationals for impairing the results to be achieved by Directive
80/987.72 Thus, Italy was held directly liable for the harm suffered by its
nationals resulting from Italy's failure to implement Directive 80/987.173
Although ultimately agreeing with the Court, the Advocate General challenged
the Court's indirectness in addressing the issue of member state liability for
directive nonimplementation. 74 According to the Advocate General, nonimple-
mentation was the underlying concern of the persons bringing the case. 75 There-
fore, utilizing the ideology of EU law, the Advocate General stressed the im-
portance of the Court directly addressing whether an individual harmed by a
member state's failure to implement a directive has the right to compensation for
the loss suffered as a result of nonimplementation. 76 The Advocate General
stressed the importance of focusing specifically on whether member states can
incur liability for failure to implement a directive that has caused harm to an
individual separate and apart from the issue of direct effect.'" Thus, it can be
argued the Advocate General took a less cautious approach than the Court,
focusing solely on member state nonimplementation without regard to the pre-
cedence and evolution of case law on direct effect. The Advocate General's
approach essentially fails to provide the safeguards of direct effect's three prong
test, 178 thereby exposing member states to a greater risk of liability. In fact, one
could construe the interpretation of Francovich v. Italian Republic by the
Advocate General to mean that when several elements of direct effect are found,
member states will be liable for directive nonimplementation.
As the Advocate General explained, a member state's failure to implement a
directive deprives EU law of its desired effect and breaches Article 5 and Article
189 of the EEC Treaty. 179 Where such breach occurs, Article 17180 requires a
member state to take all appropriate measures to remedy its default and create the
effect desired by EU law.' 81 Accordingly, the Advocate General held that
nonimplementation of a directive is an unlawful act which must be remedied by
171. Directive 80/987 specifically grants to employees the right to guaranteed payment of unpaid wage
claims upon their employers insolvency. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
172. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357, 5416, 2 C.M.L.R. 66,
115 (1993).
173. Id.
174. Id. at 5381, 2 C.M.L.R. at 82.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90. Francovich v. Itialian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5381; 2 C.M.L.R. 66,
84(1993).
178. See supra notes 50-59 and accompanying text (discussing direct effect and its three prong test).
179. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, arts. 5 & 189.
180. Id. art. 171.
181. Id.
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the state where it has caused harm to an individual,'8 2 particularly where it has
been confirmed by a judgment of the European Court of Justice in infringement
proceedings." 3 Directive 80/987, which protects the interests of individual
employees in the event of an employer's insolvency, specifically addresses the
harm to the individual in this case." 4 The Advocate General determined that
because the interests of individual employees were not protected in the face of
their employer's insolvency, Italy was obligated, under EU law, to remedy the
harm suffered by the employees as a direct result of Italy's failure to implement
Directive 80/987. ' The Advocate General limited Italy's liability to harm
suffered prior to this judgment.1
8 6
VI. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
In Francovich v. Italian Republic, the Court made quite a progressive step in
assuring directive implementation by member states. By allowing member state
nationals to recover losses from their member states for nonimplementation of an
EU directive, the Court brought the law of directive implementation one step
further.
Although, in theory, directives are binding, the European Court of Justice is not
in a position to force member states to implement them. The EEC Treaty estab-
lishes a system where the EU Commission merely enacts directives to establish
an end, and member states are left to determine the means by which the estab-
lished goals are achieved. 87 As signatories to the EEC Treaty, member states
have the ultimate responsibility to ensure the fulfillment of the goals of the
European Union through directive implementation.' 88 Therefore, implementation
182. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357, 5382, 2 C.M.L.R. 66.
102(1993).
183. Case 22/87, E.C. Commission v. Italy, 1989 E.C.R. 143. Commission v. Italy legally recognized
Italy's failure to implement Directive 80/987 in infringement proceedings. Id.
184. In this case, the harm to be prevented by Directive 80/987 is exactly the harm that occurred.
Employers went bankrupt and as a result employees were left without recourse to get wages that were due to
them. For analysis of Directive 80/987, see supra notes 89-108 and accompanying text (analyzing Directive
80/987).
185. Case 6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5382-83,2 C.M.L.R. 66, 104
(1993).
186. Id. at 5402, 2 C.M.L.R. at 105.
187. EECTREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
188. Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandese Belasting administmtie, 1963 E.C.R. 12, 2
C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
The [Union] constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have
limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the subjects of which comprise not only
the Member States but also their nationals. Independently of the legislation of Member States, [Union]
law therefore not only imposes obligations on individuals but is also intended to confer upon them rights
which become part of their legal heritage. These rights arise not only where they are expressly granted
by the Treaty, but also by reason of obligations which the Treaty imposes in a clearly defined way upon
individuals as well as upon the Member States and upon the institutions of the [European Union].
Id.
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of EU directives by member states is vital to the operation and effective function
of the European Union.'89
Although directives give specific goals, different manners of implementation
can mean the creation of different individual rights. Consequently, the purpose
of the EU to establish uniformity and harmonization, often becomes
undermined." ° In addition, because directives require implementation on the part
of member states, laxity and delinquency in member state adherence to the EEC
Treaty frequently occurs."'
Francovich v. Italian Republic is significant because it expands the ability of
the European Union to enforce its directives.' 92 Previously, in order to enforce an
EU Directive, an individual could sue claiming direct effect or the EU Com-
mission could sue a member state for noncompliance with the treaty obligation
of Article 169."93 The Grad case established that, to be directly effective, a
directive must be clear, unambiguous, and legally perfect."9 Once direct effect
has been established, individuals have the right to collect for their member state's
failure to implement the directive. 95 The rationale is that "[European Union] law
must be effectively and uniformly applied throughout the whole of the [European
Union].... [T]he fact that a [Union] rule is, as regards its form, directed to the
states does not of itself take away from individuals who have an interest in it the
right to require it to be applied in the national courts."'
96
Francovich v. Italian Republic expands the rights of individuals against
member states by allowing individuals to collect damages incurred by a member
189. One of the purposes in the passage of the SEA was "[to] enabl[e] ... institutions to exercise their
powers under conditions most in keeping with Community interests." SEA, supra note 19, at pmbl.This
language can be interpreted as empowering the Commission to enforce more stringently the implementation
of directives in order to uphold and promote the interests of the European Union. Id.
190. Daniel Vignas, The Harmonization of National Legislation and the EEC, 15 EUR. L. REV. 358, 364
(1990).
Nonimplementation of directives is the biggest obstacle in the achievement of
harmonization of laws between member states. [HIarmonization of laws is to be carried
through by means of directives ... that is by means of an instrument addressed to
* Member States, [who] are obliged to transpose it into their own laws by way of
harmonization: harmonization is aimed at reducing differences [between member states]
so as to make such laws approximate if not well-nigh equivalent.
Id.
191. The problem with nonimplementation of directives can be appreciated by examining the volume
of cases brought under the theory of direct effect, in an attempt to have a directive binding upon a member state
despite the absence of implementing legislation. See supra notes 51-59 and accompanying text (explaining the
theory of direct effect); see also notes 60-88 and accompanying text (exploring the applicability of direct effect
as exemplified in past cases before the European Court of Justice).
192. See infra notes 197-198 and accompanying text (delineating the additional remedies for nonimple-
mentation made available by Francovich which increase the ability of the European Union to enforce its
directives).
193. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 169.
194. See supra notes 61-69 (explaining the Grad case). See also notes 51-59 and accompanying text
(describing the theory of direct effect).
195. Case 9/70, Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein, 1970 E.C.R. 825, C.M.L.R. 1 (1971).
196. Case 26162, Van Gend en Loos v. Nedertandese Belasting administratie, 1963 E.C.R. 1, 6-7, 2
C.M.L.R. 105, 129 (1963).
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state's failure to implement a directive if an implementation period is prescribed
within the directive.' 97 An individual is thus given an opportunity to establish a
claim for liability against a member state for noncompliance regardless of
whether the directive is directly effective. Francovich v. Italian Republic sim-
plifies the process for finding member state liability for nonimplementation of EC
directives by giving individuals an opportunity to attack member states for EEC
Treaty noncompliance.198 This expansion of remedies for the individual seems to
further compel member states to follow the EEC Treaty and avoid delinquency
in directive implementation.
There is irony in the fact that member states must be induced to comply with
directives handed down by a Commission which they played a role in creating
and maintaining. "[T]hrough Anglo-Saxon eyes the European [Union] is not in
political or legal terms a federal system [but] under the Treaty all member State[s]
have agreed to give full effect to [Union] law."'199 Francovich v. Italian Republic,
seems to stand for the European Court of Justice's recognition that directives are
ineffective if not implemented. Francovich v. Italian Republic represents a
realization that member states must be held responsible for their obligations under
the EEC Treaty and be held liable for directive nonimplementation as an impetus
to force adherence to EU law. In order to meet the goals outlined in the EEC
Treaty, directive compliance must be enforced if the system of the European
Union that has been created by its member state participants is to reach its true
potential.
The European Union was established through the EEC Treaty, setting up a rule
of law for its signatory member states to follow. To become a part of the
European Union, member states are required to recognize and follow the rules of
the EEC Treaty, giving up some of their national sovereignty? ° Francovich v.
Italian Republic recognizes that although member states may have accepted the
rule of law of the EEC Treaty and the holding of Simmenthal v. Commission,2 '
in practice member states fail to adhere to those rules. In Francovich v. Italian
Republic, the European Court of Justice recognized the urgent need for
enforcement and implementation of EU directives by member states?2 This
197. Cases C-6190 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5416,2 C.M.L.R. 66,
115 (1993).
198. See supra note 161 and accompanying text (citing Article 5 of the EEC Treaty as authority to re-
quire member state compliance with Treaty obligations). See also Cases C-6/90 & 9/90, Francovich v. Italian
Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357,5413-17,2 C.M.L.R. 66, 115 (1993).
199. Nicholas Stewart, The Relationship Betveen the European Court of Justice and the Courts of the
Member States of the European Communities, Vol. 5,2 INT'L L. PRACTiCUM 42,43 (1992).
200. Case 92/78, 1979 E.C.R. 777. 3 C.M.L.R. 263 (1978).
Every national court must in a case within its jurisdiction apply [Union] Law in its entirety and protect
rights which the latter confers on individuals and must accordingly set aside any provisions of national
law which may conflict with it whether prior or subsequent to the [Union] rule.
Id.
201. Id.
202. Cases C-6/90 & C-9/90, Francovich v. Italian Republic, 1991 E.C.R. 5357, 5415-16, 2 C.M.L.R.
66,113-14 (1993).
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recognition implies an empowerment of the European Court of Justice in the
enforcement of the goals of the European Union.
The EEC Treaty creates an underlying framework in order to accomplish
harmonization and unification among member states. Such a foundation is useless
if not built upon. Directives ensure that member states work together to equalize
life among member states and guarantee the progress and evolution of European
unification.2 3 Without directive compliance, the EU essentially loses its gamut
of control, and unification and harmonization between member states become
meaningless ideals. Francovich v. Italian Republic is an attempt by the European
Court of Justice to urge compliance with EU Directives. This case holding
threatens member states who do not comply with the EEC Treaty and implement
directives. It warns that if states do not make directives binding then the Court
will find a way to effectuate the directives and impose member state liability.
Francovich v. Italian Republic, underscores the importance of member state
compliance in the implementation of EU directives.
VII. CONCLUSION
In Francovich v. Italian Republic, the European Court of Justice recognizes
that effective means to ensure implementation of EU Directives must be
established. Enforcement of member state compliance with the EEC Treaty and
its obligations has been a slow process. Francovich v. Italian Republic sends a
message to member states that the patience of the European Court of Justice is
waning. Member states must shape up, take responsibility and fulfill the obli-
gations that they have agreed to and accepted as rule of law. Cases like
Francovich v. Italian Republic bring the European Union closer to a system
where all of its decisions and directives will both, in theory and in practice,
become implemented by member states. Only then will Europe be able to have
a truly unified system of laws.
Europe will soon realize the stated goals of the European Union, free move-
ment of goods, capital, persons, and services. 0 4 The European Union is also cur-
rently enmeshed in the process of working to achieve a common market and
common monetary system. 5 Further integration within the European Union
requires the presence of a functioning European Union not only in theory, but
also in practice. In order to truly achieve the goals of European unification,
cooperation among EU member states is essential. It is time for member states to
appreciate the responsibilities and obligations that they have as members of the
European Union. An effective and unified means of ensuring applicability of EU
203. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (explaining the purpose of directives).
204. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text (defining the purpose and goals of the European
Union).
205. SEA, supra note 19, at pmbl. "Mhe heads of State or of Government approved the objective of the
progressive realization of economic and monetary union." Id.
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laws must occur in order to ensure that member states work together to effectuate
the goals of the EEC Treaty for the benefit of the European Union and its people.
Only actual compliance with EU directives will bring to fruition a truly functional
and effective system of binding laws within the European Union.
As Francovich v. Italian Republic demonstrates, the current system of directive
implementation by EU member states is not effective.' Due to the consistent and
repetitive failure of member states to implement EU directives, many goals of the
EU seem to be stymied.' Francovich v. Italian Republic recognizes that attempts
to ensure effective directive implementation and to discourage delinquency must
take on more force if the goals of the EU are to be fulfilled and upheld.
Francovich v. Italian Republic represents the continuing evolution of EU case
law concerning available remedial measures for directive nonimplementation by
EU member states. In Francovich v. Italian Republic, the court takes a step in the
right direction encouraging directive implementation by allowing state liability
for nonimplementation of EU directives by member states. However, the Court
failed to address the issue directly. Instead, the Court bypassed finding direct
effect when all of the requisite elements were present and created an ambiguity
in order to address state liability for directive nonimplementation. Only by
skirting the presence of direct effect did the court turn to the matter of state
liability for directive nonimplementation.
Now that state liability for directive nonimplementation has been established,
the Court must take the next logical step and advocate directive implementation
by finding member states directly liable for nonimplementation of EU Directives
without reliance on the theory of direct effect. The EU rule of law requires
implementation of directives by member states.2" It is time for the European
Court of Justice to ensure that member states adhere to EU law, not only in
theory, but in practice. Before the concept of a unified Europe will have any
viability, member states will have to learn to not only accept in theory, the
European Union rule of law, but to adhere to it in practice."
Melanie L. Ogren
206. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text (discussing problems in the European Union with
respect to directive implementation).
207. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. (citing the purpose of the SEA). The SEA was passed
to help facilitate Treaty compliance among member states in order to make the achievement of the goals of the
European Union more efficient and effective. SEA, supra note 19.
208. EEC TREATY, supra note 18, art. 189.
209. "Regarding the application of [EU] law in the member states, it can be argued that direct application
(and trumping) is essential to developing the internal cohesion and coherence that will achieve the goals of a
true customs union and (perhaps) federal system." John H. Jackson Status of Treaties in Domestic Legal
Systems: A Policy Analysis, 86 AM. J. lN'L L. 310, 320 (1992).
